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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Edward Peterson appeals in these consolidated cases from the
sentence imposed upon his conviction for felony violation of a no contact order in
Docket No. 39783, and from the orders revoking probation and executing without
reduction the sentences imposed upon his convictions for felony violation of a no
contact order in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147.

Peterson also appeals, in all

three docket numbers, from the district courts' orders denying his Rule 35
motions for reduction of sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In November 2007, Peterson physically abused his girlfriend, Dorene
Giannini, by shoving her, grabbing her by her hair and strangling her.
pp.23, 449, 489.

1
)

(PSI,

A no contact order issued, which Peterson violated three

times between January and March 2008. (PSI, p.444.) Peterson was ultimately
convicted of domestic assault (amended from felony domestic battery), as well
as three misdemeanor no contact violations, and was thereafter placed on
supervised probation and ordered to have no contact with Ms. Giannini, except
by telephone, until June 7, 2010. (PSI, pp.444, 472, 475.)
On October 3, 2008, an officer stopped Ms. Giannini for driving without
headlights. (PSI, p.441.) Peterson was in the car with Ms. Giannini and, when

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"PetersonPSl.pdf," filed in Docket No. 39783.
1

questioned, he gave the officer a false name and false date of birth.

(PSI,

pp.441, 471.)
The state charged Peterson in Docket No. 39146 (district court case no.
CRFE-2008-17740) with felony violation of a no contact order and misdemeanor
providing false information to law enforcement. (#39146/39147 R., pp.36-37.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Peterson pied guilty to the no contact order
violation, and the state dismissed the remaining charge and agreed to not file a
persistent violator enhancement.

(#39146/39147 R., pp.54-55.)

The district

court accepted Peterson's plea and imposed a unified sentence of five years,
with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (#39146/39147 R., pp.58-63.)
At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court suspended
the balance of Peterson's sentence and placed him on probation for five years,
beginning on July 23, 2009. (#39146/39147 R., pp.66-75.)
Four months later, the state filed motion for probation violation alleging
that Peterson had violated his probation officer's directive to have no contact with
Ms.

Giannini

without

first

(#39146/39147 R., pp.91-93.)

obtaining

his

probation

officer's

approval.

Peterson admitted the allegation and the court

continued him on probation, imposing as an additional court ordered condition
that Peterson have no contact with Ms. Giannini, except by telephone, until
dismissal of the case or further order of the court. (#39146/39147 R., pp.99-100,
102-05.) A written no contact order memorializing the new probation condition
was filed on December 10, 2009. (#39146/39147 R., p.101.)

2

On June 25, 2010, law enforcement responded to a report that "a
suspicious subject" had been "hiding behind a fence" in Ms. Giannini's
neighborhood and then rode his bike to Ms. Giannini's residence and entered
her yard. (PSI, pp.157, 170.) When the responding officer arrived, he observed
Peterson leaving Ms. Giannini's front yard on a bicycle. (PSI, pp.157, 170.)
The state charged Peterson in Docket No. 39147 (district court case no.
CRFE2010-10642) with felony violation of a no contact order and a persistent
violator enhancement. (#39146/39147 R., pp.241-42, 248-50.) The state also
filed a motion for probation violation in Docket No. 39146, alleging that Peterson
had violated the conditions of his probation by being charged with the new no
contact order violation, consuming alcohol, and failing to make payments toward
his court ordered financial obligations. (#39146/39147 R., pp.129-31.) Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Peterson pied guilty to the new no contact order violation in
Docket No. 39147, and the state dismissed the persistent violator enhancement
(#39146/39147 R., pp.138-39, 254-55.)

Peterson also admitted to having

violated his probation in Docket No. 39146. (#39146/39147 R., pp.138-39, 25455.)

The district court continued Peterson on probation in Docket No. 39146

and, in Docket No. 39147, it imposed a concurrent unified sentence of five years,
with one and one-half years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed
Peterson on probation for five years.

(#39146/39147 R., pp.140-45, 256-57,

259-66.) In conjunction with its probation violation and sentencing decisions, the
court entered an order on September 30, 2010, prohibiting Peterson from having
any contact with Ms. Giannini until October 2015. (#39146/39147 R., p.258.)

3

Less than three months later, on December 21, 2010, officers received a
report that a male matching Peterson's description had slashed the tires of a
vehicle that was parked in front of Ms. Giannini's home.

(PSI, pp.2, 16, 18.)

That same day, Ms. Giannini reported that someone had thrown rocks through
her front and kitchen windows. (PSI, pp.2, 16, 18.) Giannini told officers that
she believed Peterson was responsible for the vandalism.2 (PSI, pp.18-19.) She
also disclosed that, in the two days preceding the vandalism, Peterson had
called her "over 40 times" and "had sent her 145 text messages." (PSI, pp.2,
18.)

When confronted by officers, Peterson "adamantly denied" having any

contact with Ms. Giannini, either in person or by telephone, since June 25, 2010.
(PSI, pp.3, 22.)

Officers applied for and received a search warrant to obtain

Peterson's telephone records. (PSI, pp.3, 24.) According to the police reports,
those phone records showed "approximately 1368 calls and 1899 text messages
between Peterson and Giannini from 6/25/10 through 01/06/11." (PSI, pp.3, 24.)
The state charged Peterson in Docket No. 39783 (district court case no.
CRFE2011-3748) with felony violation of a no contact order. (#39783 R., pp.2627.) The state also moved to revoke Peterson's probation in Docket Nos. 39146
and 39147. (#39146/39147 R., pp.157-60, 171-74, 278-80, 291-94.) Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Peterson pied guilty to the new no contact order violation in
Docket No. 39783 and admitted to having violated his probation in Docket Nos.
39146 and 39147. (#39146/39147 R., pp.188-89, 309-10; #39783 R., pp.34-36.)
In Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147, the district court revoked Peterson's probation

2

Ms. Giannini subsequently retracted this accusation. (PSI, pp.4, 29, 32.)
4

and ordered his underlying sentences executed. (#39146/39147 R., pp.194-98,
315-319.)

In Docket No. 39783, the court imposed a unified sentence of five

years, with one and one-half years fixed, and ordered the sentence to run
consecutively to Peterson's sentences in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147.
(#39783 R., pp.54-58.) Peterson filed timely Rule 35 motions for reduction of
sentence in all three cases, all of which were denied. (#39146/39147 R., pp.199,
206-09, 215-18, 320, 327-30, 336-39; #39783 R., pp.60, 63-64, 69-73.)
Peterson timely appealed from the judgment and order denying his Rule
35 motion in Docket No. 39783 and from the orders revoking his probation and
denying his Rule 35 motions in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147. (#39146/39147
R.,

pp.200-02,

321-23; #39783 R., pp.74-76.)

The cases have been

consolidated for appeal. (Order Granting Motion To Consolidate, filed July 11,
2012.)

5

ISSUES

Peterson states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Whether the district court violated Mr. Peterson's state and
federal constitutional rights to due process by failing to maintain an
accurate copy of the record in his case.
2.
Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking
Mr. Peterson's probation in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, or,
by not reducing his sentences sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35.
3.
Whether either or both of the district courts abused their
discretion when they denied Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motions.
(Appellant's brief, p.15.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Peterson failed to show a violation of his due process right to an
adequate record on appeal?
2.
Has Peterson failed to establish that the district court in Docket Nos.
31946 and 39147 abused its discretion by revoking Peterson's probation and
executing his sentences without reduction?
3.
Has Peterson failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his
Rule 35 motions?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
Peterson Has Failed To Show A Violation Of His Due Process Right To An
Adequate Appellate Record
A.

Introduction
Peterson was charged with and convicted of three felony no contact order

violations, the most recent of which involved Peterson having unauthorized
telephone and texting contact with the victim, Dorene Giannini, in Docket No.
39783. (#39783 R., pp.26-27.) At his sentencing hearing in Docket No. 39783,
Peterson expressed concern that the PSI "specifically talk[ed] about alleged
vandalism or malicious injury to property that [Peterson had not] been charged
with," but did not "show[] the phone calls and the text messages" that formed the
basis of the no contact order violation charge, which Peterson claimed to "accept
full responsibility for."

(Tr., Vol.5, p.31, Ls.4-12.

3

)

The district court assured

Peterson that, in making its sentencing decision, it would not consider the
uncharged vandalism allegations. (Tr., Vol.5, p.31, Ls.13-20.) The court noted,
however, that the facts giving rise to the no contact order violation before it
actually came to light during the vandalism investigation, explaining:
In the investigation of that vandalism case, the police had
contact with the victim identified in this no contact order. And
through the contact of that victim, the police were able to determine
that you had been violating your no contact order that had been
issued by Judge Wetherell in the felony case - one of those felony
cases that you were on probation for.

3

The appellate record contains several separately bound volumes of transcripts.
For uniformity and ease of reference, the state has adopted the numbering and
citation system used by Peterson in his Appellant's brief. (See Appellant's brief,
p.4 n.7 (designating the separately bound transcripts by volume number).)
7

And in the course of that investigation, according to the
police report materials, they obtained a search warrant for the
phone records from your victim. Those phone records show that
between June of 2010 and January of 2011, they were able to
document some 1,368 phone calls from you to the victim, in
violation of your no contact order.
Those phone records also indicated that on that same date
- between those same dates, they were able to document 1,899
text messages between you and the victim of the no contact order.
Those materials are within the presentence materials that I've
reviewed, sir.
(Tr., Vol.5, p.31, L.21 - p.32, L.14.) Ultimately, the district court considered the
"massive number of violation[s], both in phone contact and in texting between
[Peterson] and the victim" as one of the bases for its sentencing decision. (Tr.,
Vol.5, p.45, Ls.4-9; see also Tr., Vol.5, p.44, Ls.1-11, p.46, L.2 - p.48, L.14.)
After the appellate record in Docket No. 39783 was settled, Peterson filed
a motion to augment with "records of the telephone and texting communications
from Mr. Peterson's telephone" which, Peterson claimed, "were included with the
Presentence Investigation Report and considered by the district court at
sentencing." (Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And
Statement In Support Thereof, filed on or about July 5, 2012.)

The Idaho

Supreme Court denied the motion, explaining: "[T]his Court has been advised by
the district court that there are no records of the defendant's telephone and
texting communications." (Order Denying Motion To Augment And To Suspend
The Briefing Schedule, filed July 23, 2012.)
Peterson now argues that, "[b]y not maintaining a copy of the telephone
records upon which it expressly relied, the district courts [sic] deprived Mr.
Peterson of his due process protections to an adequate appellate record."

8

(Appellant's brief, p.16.) Peterson's claim of a due process violation fails for two
independent reasons.

First, the record does not support Peterson's claim that

the phone records he seeks to include in the appellate record, as opposed to the
police reports that merely summarized the contents of those records, were
actually ever included in the sentencing materials that were presented to and
reviewed by the district court. Second, even if the phone records were included
among the sentencing materials reviewed by the district court, Peterson has
failed to demonstrate that the absence of those phone records from the
appellate record has prejudiced him in the pursuit of his appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such

as claimed due process violations is one of deference to factual findings, unless
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements
have been satisfied in light of the facts found.

State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho

375, 380, 79 P .3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720,
23 P .3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Peterson Has Failed To Show That Any Documents Are Missing From
The Appellate Record, Much Less That The "Missing" Documents Have
Prejudiced His Ability To Pursue His Appeal
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to a "record on

appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d
472, 477 (2002). In addition, although legal requirements to create a record are

9

mandatory, failure to do so is not automatically reversible error. State v. Wright,
97 Idaho 229, 231-33, 542 P.2d 63, 65-67 (1975); State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho
413, 415, 80 P.3d 349, 351 (Ct. App. 2003). To demonstrate that the record is
not sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from the record
prejudiced his ability to pursue his appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 62021, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968); Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 415, 80 P.3d at 351.
"[T]o require reversal, some specific error or prejudice resulting from failure to
record such proceedings must be called to the court's attention." Wright, 97
Idaho at 233, 542 P.2d at 67.

also State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90

P.3d 278, 290 (2003) ("[E]rror in the abstract does not necessarily rise to the
level of constitutional dimension unless and until a defendant properly presents a
specific prejudice from such error.").
Peterson's claim of a due process violation rests upon his assertion that
records of his telephone and texting communications with the victim were
included among the sentencing materials considered by the district court and,
through no fault of his own, those records are missing from the appellate record.
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-19.) Contrary to Peterson's assertions, however, there
is no indication that the district court ever had before it the actual telephone
records that are the subject of Peterson's due process claim. At sentencing, the
district court stated that, "according to the police report materials, they obtained a
search warrant for the phone records from your victim." (Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.3-5
(emphasis added).) The court then went on to explain what the police "were able
to document" from those phone records - i.e., that between June of 2010 and

10

January of 2011 there were "some 1,368 phone calls" and "1,899 text messages"
between Peterson and the victim.

(Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.6-13.) The court then

concluded, "[t]hose materials are within the presentence materials that I've
reviewed, sir." (Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.13-14 (emphasis added).)
Read in context, it appears that the district court was referring not to the
phone records themselves, but to the "police report materials" that were
contained "within the presentence materials." Consistent with the district court's
recitation, those "police report materials" are contained within the PSI and do
show precisely what the district court stated they showed - i.e., that the police
"applied for and received a search warrant to obtain telephone records" and that
a review of those records showed "approximately 1368 calls and 1899 text
messages between Peterson and Giannini from 6/25/11 through 1/06/11." (PSI,
p.24; see also PSI, p.3 (summarizing police report).) Because it appears from
the record that the documents included in the PSI and relied on by the district
court were only the "police report materials" that discussed the phone records,
not the actual phone records themselves, and because those "police report
materials" are actually included in the record on appeal, Peterson has failed to
show that any documents actually considered by the district court are missing
from the appellate record and, as such, has failed to show any due process
violation.
Even if the phone records Peterson claims are missing from the appellate
record were presented to and considered by the district court, Peterson has still
failed to establish a due process violation because he has failed to show that the

11

absence of those phone records from the appellate record has actually
prejudiced his ability to pursue his appeal.

5Llb, Polson, 92 Idaho at 620-

21, 448 P.2d at 234-35; Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 415, 80 P.3d at 351. Peterson
argues that his ability to pursue his appeal has been prejudiced because, without
the "missing" phone records, he is unable to challenge "information which was
used [by the district court] as an aggravating factor." (Appellant's brief, p.17.)
Peterson's claim of prejudice is unavailing because he has failed to identify what
it is about the "missing" information that he wishes to challenge, or even could
challenge in light of both the admissions he made in the trial court and the
existing record that otherwise supports the trial court's findings regarding the
nature and frequency of the prohibited contact.
The only information specifically relied on by the district court as it
pertained to the phone records was the fact that those records showed 1,368
calls and 1,899 texts between Peterson and Ms. Giannini in a seven-month
period.

(See Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.3-14, p.45, Ls.4-9.) That information is well

documented in the materials that are included in the appellate record (see PSI,
pp.3, 24) and was never disputed by Peterson in the trial court (see Tr., Vol.5,
p.32, Ls.3-16).

In fact, Peterson readily admitted, both at the change of plea

hearing and at sentencing, that he violated the no contact order by repeatedly
engaging in telephone and texting communications with Ms. Giannini.

(Tr.,

Vol.5, p.24, L.19- p.25, L.4, p.31, Ls.4-9.) In light of these admissions and the
existing record that supports the district court's findings that the prohibited
contact occurred and was extensive, it is hard to imagine - and Peterson has not

12

even attempted to identify- what it is about the "missing" phone records, and the
district court's reliance thereon, that Peterson could successfully challenge.
Having failed to even attempt to identify, much less demonstrate, any specific
prejudice from the "missing" records, Peterson has failed to establish a violation
of his due process rights.

Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 65, 90 P.3d at 290;

Polson, 92 Idaho at 620-21, 448 P.2d at 234-35; Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 415,
80 P.3d at 351.

II.
Peterson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Revoking His Probation And Ordering His Sentences Executed Without
Reduction In Docket Nos. 39146 And 39147
A.

Introduction
Peterson challenges the district court's sentencing decisions in Docket

Nos. 39146 and 39147, arguing that the court abused its discretion by revoking
probation or, alternatively, by not sua sponte reducing his sentences pursuant to
Rule 35. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-25.) The record, however, supports the district
court's sentencing determinations; Peterson has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

13

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Revoking Peterson's
Probation
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on

appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P .2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).

An abuse of

discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason. lg'_,_
"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho
506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether
the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued
probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho
525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). Any cause satisfactory to the court,
which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify
revocation. Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99. Contrary to Peterson's
assertions on appeal, a review of the record supports the district court's
determination that Peterson's probation was no longer achieving the goal of
rehabilitation nor consistent with the protection of society.
Peterson has repeatedly demonstrated himself incapable of or unwilling to
comply with the law and the terms of probation. At just 31 years old, Peterson
has an extensive criminal record consisting of four juvenile adjudications, six
misdemeanor convictions and five felony convictions. (PSI, pp.1-3, 156-58, 44244.) Peterson was twice placed on probation as a juvenile: the first time, his
probation was revoked and "he spent three plus months in a boot camp"; the

14

second time, he completed his probation but, within two months of his release
from supervision, was charged with three new felonies - aggravated motor
vehicle theft, conspiracy to commit 1st degree aggravated motor vehicle theft,
and distribution of marijuana. (PSI, pp.442-43, 445.) He was convicted of two of
the felonies in May 2000, received a two-year prison sentence and was paroled,
but violated his parole in August 2001. (PSI, pp.442, 445.) He was thereafter
reinstated on parole for approximately one year before "the case closed" in
December 2003.

(PSI, p.445.)

During that year, he committed two more

criminal offenses - trespass and petit theft. (PSI, p.443.)
Peterson was sentenced for his trespass and petit theft convictions in
2005. (PSI, pp.443.) He left Idaho either shortly before or shortly after that, but
returned in 2007 and was subsequently arrested for malicious injury to property,
domestic assault/battery, vandalism and multiple no contact order violations.
(PSI, pp.444-45.)

Peterson injured the victim of the domestic battery, Dorene

Giannini, by hitting her, shoving her, grabbing her by the hair and strangling her.
(PSI, pp.23, 449, 488-89.) Peterson was ordered to have no contact with Ms.
Giannini but violated the no contact order three separate times while the
domestic battery case was pending. (PSI, p.444.)
Four months after Peterson was sentenced for the domestic battery and
misdemeanor no contact order violations, and while a no contact order was still
in effect, an officer discovered Peterson riding in a car with Ms. Giannini. (PSI,
pp.441, 471.) Peterson gave the officer a false name and date of birth. (PSI,
pp.441, 471.) Peterson subsequently admitted violating the no contact order but
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attempted to justify his behavior by claiming that the contact with Ms. Giannini
arose only as a result of Ms. Giannini's efforts to support Peterson in his
recovery from alcoholism and to help him avoid a relapse. (PSI, pp.441-42; Tr.,
Vol.1, p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.B.) As a result of the contact, Peterson was convicted
of his first felony no contact order violation and was sentenced to a period of
retained jurisdiction.

(#39146/39147 R., pp.58-63.) He performed well in the

retained jurisdiction program and was placed on probation in July 2009.
(#39146/39147 R., pp.66-75; PSI, pp.639-45.)
Four months later, Peterson's probation officer filed a report of probation
violation alleging that Peterson had violated the probation officer's directive to
have no contact with Ms. Giannini. (PSI, pp.629-31.) According to the report,
the officer "received information that [Peterson] was at the victim's residence on
a regular basis." (PSI, p.629.) Following up on that information, the officer went
to Ms. Giannini's residence and found Peterson hiding in her bathroom. (PSI,
pp.629-30.) Peterson "locked himself in the bathroom and only exited upon a
request from [Ms.] Giannini," and then argued with his probation officer for
several minutes "about his inability to see his girlfriend." (PSI, p.630.) Due to
what the officer perceived at Peterson's "limited exposure to treatment and his
inability to follow [his probation officer's] verbal orders to have no contact with the
victim," the probation officer requested the district court to impose as a written
order of probation that Peterson have no contact with Ms. Giannini without his
supervising officer's permission.

(PSI, p.630.) The district court followed the

recommendation, continued Peterson on probation and amended the probation
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conditions to expressly include a written no contact order.

(#39146/39147 R.,

pp.101-05.)
Six months later, Peterson violated the no contact order and the
conditions of his probation by hiding behind a fence in Ms. Giannini's
neighborhood and then entering her front yard. (PSI, pp.157, 170.) Once again,
Peterson admitted the no contact order violation but attempted to justify his
behavior, claiming that he was merely "doing a good deed" and attempting to
help Ms. Giannini by "try[ing] to find the person who introduced her to meth."
(PSI, p.158; Tr., Vol.1,

p.86,

L.11

-

p.87, L.24.)

Despite Peterson's

demonstrated inability or unwillingness to abide by every no contact order that
had been put in place, and despite the fact that Peterson had now been
convicted of his second felony no contact order violation, the district court
exercised leniency and continued him on probation for a second time in Docket
No. 39146 and placed him on probation in Docket No. 39147, again ordering that
Peterson have no contact with Ms. Giannini. (#39146/39147 R., pp.142-45, 25866.)

In so doing, the district court specifically admonished Peterson that "this

[was] his final opportunity on probation" and "[a] violation of the no-contact order
... if proven or admitted, [would] violate a fundamental condition of probation and
[would] result in imposition of the underlying sentence."

(#39146/39147 R.,

p.263.)
It appears from the record that, even as the district court was sentencing
Peterson for his second felony no contact order violation in September 2010,
Peterson was still engaging in prohibited contact with Ms. Giannini. According to
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police reports, a search of Peterson's phone records showed "approximately
1368 calls and 1899 text messages between Peterson and Giannini from
06/25/10 through 01/06/11."

(PSI, pp.3, 24.)

Consistent with his pattern of

justifying and minimizing his behavior, Peterson admitted the contacts but
claimed Ms. Giannini initiated them by coming to his workplace and seeking his
comfort and assistance because she had been raped.
pp.306-07; PSI, p.5; Tr., Vol.1, p.117, L.21 - p.6.)

(#39146/39147 R.,

Peterson claimed to have

initially rebuffed Ms. Giannini's request for assistance but, by his own admission,
he was the one who thereafter rekindled the relationship that resulted in the sixmonth texting and calling campaign. (#39146/39147 R., pp.306-07; PSI, p.5; Tr.,
Vol.1, p.118, L.7-p.119, L.11.)
The district court gave Peterson multiple opportunities to succeed on
community supervision.

With each new opportunity, Peterson claimed to

recognize that he could not contact his victim and promised to abide by the
court's orders of no contact. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.6-15; Tr., Vol.1, p.87, L.25 p.88, L.5, p.97, Ls.8-17.)

With each new opportunity, Peterson promptly

violated the no contact orders, demonstrating his utter disregard for the court's
orders or the terms of his probation.

Clearly, Peterson's probation was not

achieving its rehabilitative purpose. The district court thus acted well within its
discretion in revoking that probation and executing Peterson's sentences.
On appeal, Peterson concedes he violated his probation multiple times,
but contends there are a number of mitigating factors that militated against the
revocation of his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-25.) While it is undoubtedly
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true, as Peterson contends, that he suffers from some mental health issues as a
result of a traumatic brain injury, that he has purported to accept responsibility
and express remorse for his unyielding failures to abide by the court's orders,
that he enjoys the support of his family, friends and employers, and that Ms.
Giannini was often complicit in Peterson's no contact order violations, these
considerations in no way diminish the district court's conclusion that Peterson
was no longer an appropriate candidate for community supervision. Information
with respect to all of these facts was before the court, both at the time it imposed
the original sentences and when it revoked Peterson's probation.

That the

district court did not place greater mitigating weight on these factors, or elevate
them above the need, once and for all, to impress upon Peterson the
seriousness of his no contact order violations and his continued violations of the
law, does not establish an abuse of discretion.
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Peterson was no longer an appropriate candidate for community
supervision.

Given any reasonable view of the facts, Peterson has failed to

establish an abuse of discretion.

D.

Peterson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Declining To Sua Sponte Reduce His Sentences Upon
Revoking Probation
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original

sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State
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v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's
decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.

Those standards require an

appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence
was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment."

State v.

Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are:
"(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the
revocation of probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 29,218 P.3d at 8.
Citing the same factors he claims militated against the revocation of his
probation, Peterson argues that the district court abused its discretion by
declining to sua sponte reduce his sentences. (Appellant's brief, p.25.) For the
reasons already set forth in section 11.C., supra, and incorporated herein by
reference, Peterson has failed to show that he was entitled to a reduction of his
sentence. Peterson has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
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111.
Peterson Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His
Rule 35 Motions
After he was sentenced in Docket No. 39783 and his probation was
revoked in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147, Peterson moved in all three cases for
reduction of his sentences pursuant to Rule 35. (#39146/39147 R., pp.199, 320;
#39783 R., p.60.) The district courts denied the motions, reasoning that
Peterson's sentences were reasonable as imposed and Peterson had failed
provide any new or additional information warranting a reduction of his
sentences.

(#39146/39147 R., pp.215-18, 336-39; #39783 R., pp.69-73.)

Peterson now challenges the courts' decisions, but he has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion.
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Peterson must "show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." Id. Peterson has
failed to satisfy his burden.
In Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147, the only information Peterson provided
in support of his I.C.R. 35 motions was 1) his statement that he "hope[d] to enroll
in the Therapeutic Community while incarcerated," 2) a copy of the APSI that
showed

Peterson

participated

in

and

successfully

completed

several

rehabilitative programs while incarcerated during his rider; and 3) a letter of
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support from his employer. (#39146/39147 R., pp.206-14, 327-35.) The district
court considered this information but rejected as a basis for reducing Peterson's
sentences, reasoning:
Mr. Peterson has been given numerous opportunities to reform his
behavior. Mr. Peterson performed well on his rider in the 2008
case, yet he violated his probation three times following the rider.
Furthermore, the last time Mr. Peterson was granted probation, he
only managed to go for three months before having a probation
violation filed against him. Consequently, the Court is unconvinced
of Mr. Peterson's rehabilitative potential, and the Court believes
that a long fixed period of incarceration will at least ensure that Mr.
Peterson will not cause any harm to society and deter him in the
future from flouting the law. Therefore, considering the nature of
the offense and the character of the offender with the goal of
protecting society in mind, the Court believes that Mr. Peterson's
sentences in these cases were reasonable when imposed, and
remain reasonable now.
(#31946/39147 R., pp.217-18, 338-39.)

Although Peterson argues otherwise,

the record amply supports the district court's determination that Peterson's
desire for community-based rehabilitation did not outweigh the gravity of his
offenses, his multiple probation violations, and his failure to obtain communitybased treatment when given the opportunity to do so.

Peterson has failed to

establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions for
reduction of the sentences imposed in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147.
Peterson has also failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial
of his motion for reduction of sentence in Docket No. 39783. As noted by the
district court in that case, Peterson did not provide any new or additional
information that would warrant reconsideration of his sentence.
p.71.)

(#39783 R.,

Instead, he requested leniency "because the communications between

himself and Giannini were mutual" and because he was performing well while
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incarcerated - e.g., he obtained a job, began schooling and attended AA
meetings.

(#39783 R., pp.64, 71.)

Again, the district court considered this

information but determined it did not justify of the sentence imposed, reasoning,
The sentence imposed is within the statutory boundaries and was
made in light of the required sentencing factors. Peterson has not
provided an adequate reason for the Court to reconsider his
sentence. That Peterson's communications with Giannini may
have been mutual does not change the Court's view that
Peterson's disregard of lawful court orders on multiple occasions
make him deserving of the sentence imposed. It is worth nothing
that, at the time of these incidents, Peterson was being supervised
on [a] suspended sentence for two (2) felonies involving identical
conduct. Additionally, while Peterson's progress in prison is worthy
of consideration, it is of minimal significance because it may not be
an accurate indicator of future behavior in a noncustodial setting
when viewed in the context of the whole record. [Citations omitted.]
While the Court appreciates Petersons' efforts at self-improvement,
the Court is satisfied that the imposed sentence remains
reasonable under the circumstances and in light of the above
sentencing factors.
(#39783 R., p.72.)

Once again, the record supports the district court's

determination. That Peterson's communications with Ms. Giannini were mutual
was not new information at all and, in fact, was specifically considered by the
district court as a mitigating factor when it crafted Peterson's sentence.
Vol.5, p.44, p.19 - p.45, L.23.)

(Tr.,

Moreover, while Peterson's progress while

incarcerated is laudable and is undoubtedly relevant to the parole board's
consideration of whether to release him at his earliest parole date, the district
court correctly determined that it was not itself a basis to reduce Peterson's
already reasonable sentence.

Indeed, if history is any indicator, the fact that

Peterson does well while incarcerated bears little relationship to his ability to
succeed on probation.

(Compare PSI, pp.639-45 (6/23/09 APSI detailing
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Peterson's success in the retained jurisdiction program) with pp.629-31
(11/18/09 report of probation violation), 241-43 (2/21/10 report of probation
violation), 173-75 (6/28/10 report of probation violation).) Peterson has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district courts'
orders revoking Peterson's probation and denying his Rule 35 motions for
reduction of sentence.
th

DATED this 19 day of November 2012.
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